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Abstract—Token Curated Registries (TCR) are decentral-
ized recommendation systems that can be implemented using
Blockchain smart contracts. They allow participants to vote for
or against adding items to a list through a process that involves
staking tokens intrinsic to the registry, with winners receiving the
staked tokens for each vote. A TCR aims to provide incentives to
create a well-curated list. In this work, we consider a challenge
for these systems - incentivizing token-holders to actually engage
and participate in the voting process. We propose a novel token-
inflation mechanism for enhancing engagement, whereby only
voting participants see their token supply increased by a pre-
defined multiple after each round of voting. To evaluate this
proposal, we propose a simple 4-class model of voters that
captures all possible combinations of two key dimenions: whether
they are engaged (likely to vote at all for a given item) or
disengaged, and whether they are informed (likely to vote in
a way that increases the quality of the list) or uninformed, and
a simple metric to evaluate the quality of the list as a function
of the vote outcomes. We conduct simulations using this model
of voters and show that implementing token-inflation results in
greater wealth accumulation for engaged voters. In particular,
when the number of informed voters is sufficiently high, our
simulations show that voters that are both informed and engaged
see the greatest benefits from participating in the registry when
our proposed token-inflation mechanism is employed. We further
validate this finding using a simplified mathematical analysis.
Index Terms—Token-curated registry; decentralized recom-
mendations; Blockchain
I. INTRODUCTION
Token Curated Registries (TCR) have been proposed as
a decentralized alternative to centralized recommendation
systems that can be implemented using Blockchain smart
contracts [1]. They allow participants to vote for or against
adding items to the list through a process that involves staking
tokens intrinsic to the registry, with winners receiving the
staked tokens. A TCR aims to provide incentives to create
a well-curated list, by making such a list valuable for token-
holders. A TCR could be created for any topic where a set
of recommendations could be useful, for example a list of
universities, or restaurants, or reliable sources of data.
One example of a real-world TCR project is the adChain
registry [2] by MetaX, which curates a list of possible web-
sites that could be used for digital advertising. There are
now several application and development projects related to
TCR such as the Ocean Protocol [3] and Decentralized Data
Marketplace (DDM) [4], which advocate using TCR to curate
data sources, and Dirt Protocol [5] which seeks to develop
tools for deploying TCR’s for different domains. A recent
study explored the TCR from the perspective of game theory,
to understand the types of equilibria that may be possible,
and concluded that good and bad voting outcomes could both
be valid equilibria in some cases, resulting in problems of
coordination [6]. In this work, we focus on a different aspect
of TCR’s: how to increase engagement by token holders to
encourage them to vote. In the absence of explicit incentives
to vote, it is possible for some (or even many) token holders
to act as “free-riders” by letting others do the work of voting
to curate the TCR list.
We introduce and explore an enhancement to TCR’s that is
aimed to enhance engagement. In a nutshell, our proposal is to
supply additional tokens (at a fixed multiplicative rate) to token
holders each time that they vote. This results in inflation since
the total number of tokens is increasing, each token is worth a
smaller fraction of the value of the TCR. However, participants
that vote regularly (i.e. are engaged) are better able to keep
up with inflation as their token supply increases at the rate
of inflation, compared to participants that are disengaged. In a
TCR where a majority of the participants make good decisions
when they vote, the intrinsic TCR value will naturally increase
as the quality of the TCR improves, and with our proposed
enhancement, we can hypothesize that over time a significant
fraction of the “wealth” inherent in the TCR economy would
accumulated by those voters that are both engaged enough to
vote often and informed enough to vote correctly. This in turn
creates an incentive for more engaged and informed voters to
become participants of a given TCR.
In order to evaluate this hypothesis, we build a quantitative
model that is purposely simplified to yield useful insights.
Our modeling has two major components: a) a probabilistic
voter behavior model, and b) a metric for TCR quality. For
voter behavior, we assume that each voter is engaged with
certain probability (else disengaged), and independently of
that, is informed with a certain probability (else uninformed).
A voter that is engaged votes with a higher probability than
a voter that is disengaged. And a voter that is informed has a
higher defined probability of making correct decisions when
voting, compared to a voter that is uninformed. For measuring
TCR quality, we focus on TCRs where for all items being
considered, their suitability for the list can be described in a
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binary manner - i.e. each item is inherently either good or
bad. We adopt a very simple metric that we refer to as linear
unit reward and penalty (LURP) metric, which adds a unit to
each ”correct” decision (to add a good item to the registry
or reject a bad item) and subtracts a unit for each ”incorrect”
decision (to reject a good item or add a bad item). Although in
general the total monetary value (or capitalization) associated
with the TCR could be modeled as any monotonic function
of this quality metric. For ease of exposition, in this work,
we simply use the identity function, i.e., the total value of the
TCR at a given time is assumed to be the same as its LURP
metric at that time.
We conduct simulation-based experiments using our model
to evaluate our hypothesis that the proposed inflation mecha-
nism results in greater wealth for informed and engaged voters
(assuming a majority of voters are informed) compared to the
control of not using inflation. The simulation tool we have
developed may be of independent interest to the community
and we have therefore made it publicly available as an open
source tool online at https://github.com/ANRGUSC/TCRsim.
We also present a mathematical analysis of a further simplified
setting that validates the key findings from the simulations.
In the following section, we describe our TCR model in
more detail. After that, we present our simulation parameters
and results, followed by mathematical analysis of a simplified
setting. Finally, we present a summary of our contribution and
discuss possible caveats and future work.
II. A TCR MODEL WITH TOKEN INFLATION
A. Basic TCR model
We model the TCR very simply as follows:
• There are N number of voters, that vote successively on
each of L number of items.
• An item is voted into the registry if more than 50% of
the voters vote to add it in.
• At each round of voting for a given new item, all voters
are required to stake a certain amount of tokens. If the
voter sides with the majority vote in that round, she/he
gets the total stake divided by number of winning voters;
if a voter sides with the minority vote in that round, she/he
will lose all staked tokens. If the voter does not have the
required number of tokens to be staked in a given round
she/he cannot vote.
• We assume that we are dealing with an objective TCR,
where each item is objectively either ”good” or ”bad” -
and that a voter that votes correctly would vote to add a
”good” item to the registry and to not add a ”bad” item
to the registry (the opposite being true if the voter votes
incorrectly).
Some notes are in order. In traditional TCR, the stake pool
also includes tokens staked by whoever proposes a new item
to be added to the registry - we choose to omit this in our
modeling for simplicity; assuming a sufficiently large pool
of voters, it should have negligible impact on the outcomes.
Another particular decision we make is to have all of the staked
tokens of the minority voters transferred to the majority voters.
B. Proposed inflation mechanism
In traditional TCRs the minimum amount that must be
staked by each voter is kept constant. With the aim of
incentivizing engagement, we propose two key changes:
1) After each round of voting, we propose to increase the
tokens available to those participants that have voted by
a given multiplicative factor. Specifically, we introduce
an inflation rate parameter δ. Each voter j that votes in a
round t gets its tokens Tj inflated as follows: Tj(t+1) =
Tj(t)∗ (1+ δ), where Tj(t) and Tj(t+1) represent that
voter’s number of tokens before (at the end of some
round t) and after inflation (before voting on item t+1).
Voters that do not vote see no change in the number of
tokens they hold. Note that setting δ = 0 recovers the
original, un-inflated TCR.
2) We increase the minimum amount of tokens that should
be staked over time to keep pace with the growing
number of tokens in the system. Specifically, say that
before voting for the first item, each voter has a certain
number of initial tokens (T (0)), and must stake a certain
number of tokens S(0) that is assumed to be a fixed
percentage of the initial tokens before voting. In subse-
quent rounds of voting the required stake amount S(t)
is increased to keep pace with the inflation as follows,
where Ttotal(t) represents the total number of tokens:
S(t) = S(0)T0 ×
Ttotal(t)
N
C. Voter behavior model
For the purpose of simulation, we further model voters as
being classified into four categories based on two orthogonal
binary classifications: they are either informed or uninformed;
engaged or disengaged. We use two i.i.d. Bernoulli distribu-
tions for these classifications to determine which category each
voter belongs to. We describe below additional parameters
used in the simulations:
• pE is the probability a given voter is engaged, and
hence probability 1 − pE is the probability the voter
is disengaged. If a voter is engaged, she/he participates
in the vote for a given item with Bernoulli probability
pV E , and if a voter is disengaged, she/he participates in
the vote for a given item with probability pV D which
is assumed to be smaller than pV E . In this work, we
have made a simplifying assumption that the engagement
characteristic of a voter does not change over time.
• pI is the probability a given voter is informed, and hence
1− pI is the probability that the voter is uninformed. If
a voter is informed, if voting, she/he votes correctly with
probability pV CI , and if a voter is uninformed, if voting,
she/he votes correctly with probability pV CU
D. TCR quality model
For our evaluation, we further need some measure of the
quality of the TCR, and how that in turn translates to value.
We use a very simple linear model that we refer to as the
linear unit reward and penalty (LURP) metric, which assumes
that each correct or valid vote (to add a good item or keep
out a bad item) increases the quality of the TCR by a unit
amount, while each incorrect or invalid vote (to leave out a
good item or add in a bad item) decreases the quality by a unit
amount. In general the value of the TCR could be expected
to be monotonic with the quality metric. For simplicity, we
assume the identity function so that we describe the inherent
value of the TCR (the total value of all tokens in the economy)
at any time by the LURP metric of the TCR. Thus, we can
write the total value of the TCR at any round t, Wtot(t) in
terms of the number of corect and incorrect votes upto that
round (denoted Vcorrect and Vincorrect respectively):
Wtot = Vcorrect − Vincorrect (1)
It should be noted that in reality the LURP metric is only
computable if the objective/ground truth about each item is
known, and in practice the total value of the TCR may not
be simply equal to the LURP metric, but these are useful
modeling assumptions that allow us to evaluate the proposed
mechanism.
For voters in each of the four classes of voters (informed-
engaged, informed-disengaged, uninformed-engaged, and
uninformed-disengaged), we can measure their average wealth
in a given class A, denoted as WˆA as follows:
WˆA =
Wtot
Ttot
× TA
nA
(2)
where Wtot is the LURP-based total value of the TCR, Ttot
is the total number of tokens, TA is the total number of tokens
among voters in class A, and nA is the total number of voters
in class A.
In the next section we show through simulations that with
inflation, engaged voters generally have greater wealth than
without inflation, while the quality or value of the TCR
depends crucially on the fraction of voters that are informed.
This creates an incentive for the TCR to attract more engaged
and informed voters, which, in turn, should further improve
the quality of the TCR.
III. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
We created a simulator using Python called TCRsim (avail-
able online at https://github.com/ANRGUSC/TCRsim) that
allows us to evaluate and understand the impact of token infla-
tion. Table I shows the parameters we used in our simulations.
In the following we present a set of illustrative results from
these simulations. In these simulations we essentially vary two
of the parameters: a) the probability of being informed (we
vary this to take on three values: 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9) and b)
whether or not inflation is used (with a default value of 2%).
Figures 1, 2, and 3 present the results of our simulations.
The following are the key findings from the simulations:
• When the probability of voters being informed, and hence
voting correctly on items, is low (a bad case for the
TCR), as considered in figure 1 then the TCR value and
hence the wealth of voters in each class, stays at zero.
This is because most votes are influenced strongly by
Parameter Values
L 50
N 100
T (0) 100
S(0) 5.0
δ 0.0, 0.2
pE 0.5
pI 0.1, 0.5, 0.9
pV E 0.8
pVD 0.2
pV CI 0.85
pV CU 0.15
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
the uninformed voters and result in a poor quality TCR
with virtually no valid or correctly added items. The
uninformed voters have a high number of tokens with
or without inflation but it is immaterial given the zero-
value of the TCR. Such a TCR in practice will struggle
to survive, regardless of whether inflation is used.
• In the case where the probability of being informed is
moderate (0.5), simulations show high variance; here we
present one particuar run. We see that the value of the
TCR fluctuates, and so does the fortune of the various
classes of users. We can see that because of the even prob-
ability of correct votes, all classes of voters have about
the same wealth in case of the traditional TCR. However,
with inflation, we can see that the engaged voters (both
informed and uninformed) have higher wealth on average
than disengaged voters
• When the probability of being informed is high (a good
case for the TCR), as considered in figure 3, then we see
that TCR value increases linearly with each vote (since
all votes end up being correct and valued). In either case,
informed voters get more tokens and wealth compared
to uninformed voters; we can see that with inflation, the
engaged informed voters have significantly higher wealth
compared to unengaged voters, thus giving an incentive
to voters for being more engaged, with informed voters
benefiting the most because they also win more of the
staked tokens across the voting process.
Finally, to evaluate the impact of increasing the inflation
rate further, we conduct one additional simulation for the case
where pI is 0.9 but where the inflation rate is increased to
5%. The results of this experiment in terms of the average
wealth for users of each class is shown in figure 4. We see
that compared to the case of 2% inflation for the same high
probability of informed voters (seen in the right column of 3),
this case results in even higher wealth for uinformed but
engaged voters compared to informed disengaged voters. This
shows that, as expected, higher inflation gives even higher
incentive to voters for being engaged, to the point that even
uninformed voters can have a significant benefit. From a
realistic perspective however, in practice, this greater incentive
for engagement has to be weighted against the concern that
engaging uninformed voters too much runs the risk of having
Fig. 1. Simulation results for pI = 0.1, left column: without inflation; right column: with 2% inflation
Fig. 2. Simulation results for pI = 0.5, left column: without inflation; right column: with 2% inflation
Fig. 3. Simulation results for pI = 0.9, left column: without inflation; right column: with 2% inflation
Fig. 4. Results for pI = 0.9 with an inflation rate of 5%
a lower quality TCR, thus a low/moderate inflation rate might
be preferred to having a high inflation rate.
IV. MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS
To gain more insight, we consider and analyze a simple,
idealized setting that is amenable to closed-form modeling.
For the analysis in this section, we assume that:
• Disengaged participants never vote, while engaged par-
ticipants always vote
• Informed voters are always correct while uninformed
voters are always incorrect
• The number of informed engaged voters nIE is more
than the number of uninformed engaged voters nUE so
that correct decisions are made for each item. (Also, we
denote by nID and nUD the number of informed disen-
gaged and uninformed disengaged voters, respectively).
• Each time there is a vote, each participant is required to
stake an amount that is equal to σ fraction of the total
token held by each uninformed participant.
Under these assumptions, the number of tokens held by
disengaged participants after voting on the kth item remains
constant:
T
(k)
ID = T
(k)
UD = T0 (3)
The number of tokens held by engaged, but uninformed
participants varies as follows (they lose the staked amount
which is a σ fraction of their holdings at each round and
experience the token inflation of 1+δ for voting in each round
:
T
(k)
UE = T0(1− σ)k(1 + δ)k (4)
Note that so long as (1+δ) > 11−σ the uninformed engaged
participants will see their token holdings increase, if the two
terms are equal then their token holdings will remain constant,
and if the inequality is reversed the uninformed engaged
participants will see their token holdings decrease.
The number of tokens held by engaged but informed par-
ticipants shows an increase due to the stake winnings of each
round as well as due to the inflation for voting.
T
(k)
IE = (T
(k−1)
IE + (T
(k−1)
UE σ
nUE
nIE
))(1 + δ) (5)
= (T
(k−1)
IE + T0σ
nUE
nIE
(1− σ)(k−1)(1 +
δ)(k−1))(1 + δ) (6)
By solving the recursive expression, the above can be simpli-
fied to:
T
(k)
IE = T0(1 + δ)
k(1 + σ
nUE
nIE
k−1∑
n=0
(1− σ)n) (7)
≈ T0(1 + δ)k(1 + nUE
nIE
) (8)
, where the approximation holds for sufficiently large number
of iterations.
From this it can be seen that the number of tokens held
by informed engaged voters in this cases always increases
exponentially, compounded by the inflation rate.
The total number of tokens in the TCR after k votes is given
as
T
(k)
tot = T0(nID + nUD + nUE(1− σ)k(1 + δ)k +
nIE(1 + δ)
k(1 +
nUE
nIE
)) (9)
If we model the total value of the TCR again as the number
of correct decisions, the value per token after k votes becomes:
W
(k)
tot
T
(k)
tot
=
k
T
(k)
tot
(10)
Then the value per token varies over time as O( k
(1+δ)k
).
Taking into account the number of tokens held by each class
of voters as analyzed above and observing their functional
form, it follows that:
• The wealth of engaged informed participants increases
linearly.
• The wealth of engaged uninformed participants may
initially increase sub-linearly (if the inflation rate is
sufficiently high in relation to the stake percentage) but
will eventually decrease to 0 if enough votes are held.
• The wealth of unengaged participants may also increase
initially for a few votes but will also soon decrease and
tend to 0.
Thus this simplified analysis also reinforces the point made
through the more detailed simulations, that the proposed
inflation mechanism gives the most incentive to engaged and
informed voters (so long as the number of informed engaged
voters is higher than the uninformed engaged voters).
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The contributions of this work are as follows.
• We have proposed in this paper a mechanism to in-
centivize engagement using token inflation, specifically,
increasing the number of tokens for users that participate
in votes.
• We have presented a simple (albeit static) model of
voter engagement and informed-ness along with a simple
model of TCR value that allows us to evaluate the impact
of the token-inflation mechanism.
• We wrote a custom simulator in Python called TCRSim
that we make publicly available, which we have used to
evaluate the proposed mechanism.
• Our simulation results show that i) the percentage of
informed voters has a significant impact on the TCR
value, and ii) with the inflation mechanism, engaged
voters end up with greater wealth (corrected for inflation)
than in the traditional TCR without token-inflation, while
unengaged voters have less wealth. This shows that the
proposed modification provides an incentive for voters to
be more engaged.
Though we did not explicitly address how the token inflation
mechanism would be implemented in a particular TCR, it
is quite feasible to implement it; one possibility would be
through a smart contract that automatically tracks and rewards
the voters with new tokens minted after each round of voting.
Another approach suitable for TCR’s with a maximum number
of candidates to be considered would be to pre-mint and set
aside a number of tokens for engagement incentives to be
dispensed to voters after each round.
In future work, we would like to consider how the incentives
could potentially affect the distribution of engaged/engaged
voters in the system over time, for example, by considering
the decision to vote or note as strategies from a game theoretic
perspective, and how that in turn could impact TCR quality
and the distribution of wealth. We could also consider more
complex quality metrics and ways in which the quality of votes
in the TCR relate to its value.
Finally, a caveat is in order. A crucial assumption in our
work has been that a TCR whose total number of tokens
increases exponentially but somewhat predictably over time
(a form of controlled inflation) will be acceptable in the real
world. Essentially anyone that holds a fixed amount of tokens
without participating in the voting will see their value decrease
steadily due to inflation, so that the tokens will be preferred to
be held and used only by those actively involved with voting
on the TCR. This means that the token by itself has little value
outside the TCR-economy for passive investor; However, a
carefully-designed derivative that bets on the future of the TCR
value could be of interest to such a passive investor assuming
the percentage of informed voters is sufficiently high to build
that value. How this plays out in real systems might be best
explored empirically through projects that implement such a
mechanism.
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